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SELF INCRIMINATION BY FEDERAL GRAND JURY
WITNESSES: UNIFORM PROTECTION ADVOCATED
FEDERAL grand jury investigations often conflict with the fifth amendment
prohibition against compulsory self incrimination.1 Embodying historical op-
position to coerced disclosure of one's own guilt, the fifth amendment subordi-
nates the official quest for evidence to the individual's need for safeguards.
2
The grand jury, on the other hand, provides the government its most effective
forum for interrogating suspected offenders.3 Originally established to prevent
unjustified prosecutions, 4 it operates today in camera, under the supervision
of a foreman, to call witnesses, assess information presented by the prosecutor,
discover criminal activity and return indictments. 5 Its inquiries and the fifth
1. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. A grand jury proceeding is a criminal case in terms
of the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination since the protection extends to
any investigation in which a witness might incriminate himself. Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892). See also 8 WIGMoRE, EViDExcE § 2252(1) (c) (3d cd. 1940) (here-
inafter cited as WIGIORE) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 225 (1954) (collecting cases illustrating
situations in which the fifth amendment is applicable).
2. For discussion and history of the privilege against self incrimination, see Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930) ; Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949); Pittman, The Colonial and
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L.
REv. 763 (1935). See also 8 WiaaxoRE §§ 2250-51 and cases cited.
"The duty [to testify before the grand jury], so onerous at times, yet so necessary
to the administration of justice according to the forms and modes established in our
system of government ... is subject to mitigation in exceptional circumstances; there is a
constitutional exemption... from being a witness against oneself .... But, aside from [this]
exception... the witness is bound not only to attend but to tell what he knows in answer
to questions framed for the purpose of bringing out the truth of the matter under inquiry."
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919).
3. For cases in which elaborate grand jury interrogation disclosed information lead-
ing to conviction, see United States v. Klein, 124 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 247
F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957) ; cases cited note 19 infra.
4. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
For a history of the grand jury system and its early role as guardian against capricious
indictments, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 321-23 (7th ed. 1956);
McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 MINN. L. REv. 153, 156-69 (1942) ; Younger,
The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CRild. L., C. & P.S. 26, 214 (1955).
5. FED. R. CRIm. P. 6. The grand jury is summoned and impaneled by a judge of a
United States District Court. Its function is not only to determine whether an accused
should stand trial but also to conduct a general investigation into criminal activity within
the jurisdiction of the court. For the prosecutor's role, see Mellott, Model Charge to the
Grand Jury, 21 OKLA. B.A.J. 1265 (1950). See, generally, Wallace v. Hunter, 149 F.2d
59 (10th Cir. 1945) ; Gold, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Grand Jury
Proceedings, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 395 (1951) ; Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers
and Limitations, 37 MiNN. L. REv. 586 (1953).
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amendment have been accommodated by granting witnesses either complete
immunity from questioning 6 or a privilege to refrain from self incrimination
by invoking the amendment as needed.7  Uneven treatment occurs because
courts seeking a proper definition of constitutional protection in this context
have until recently adopted two different rules applicable to criminal trials.
8
Implementation of the fifth amendment at trial rests on a formal distinction
between the status of witness and defendant. A witness must take the stand 0
but may avoid self incrimination by claiming the constitutional privilege.10
6. See United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), discussed note 17
infra; see also United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955) ; cases cited note 19 infra. For cases refusing to grant immunity from grand
jury questioning to witnesses, see O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir.
1930) ("mere summoning of a witness before the grand jury gives no basis for the assump-
tion that his constitutional privilege will be impaired") ; United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed.
156, 163 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902) (since a witness cannot claim his privilege until he has
been sworn, the constitutional provision cannot be violated until that time) ; United States
v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1954) (fifth amendment does not prevent indi-
vidual from being called to testify before grand jury at which time he makes his election
to testify or not). See also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943) (dissenting
opinion) (privilege is to withhold answers, not to limit the range of public inquiry). But
see cases cited notes 16-17 infra.
8. See notes 17, 19 infra analyzing application of trial court distinctions in grand
jury proceedings. Buet see United States v. Scully, supra note 7, at 115 (criticizing analogy
drawn between trial and grand jury as unsound).
9. Witnesses have long been required by statute to appear and testify before a federal
petit jury. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, c. 80, § 3, 10 STAT. 161, 169. This section is embodied
in the compulsory process provision of FED. R. Caxm. P. 17.
10. 8 Wmmonm § 2252, at 324. The scope of the protection has been broadly defined in
determining whether an answer may tend to incriminate. Thus, in the leading case of
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951), the Court said: "In this setting it
was not 'perfectly clear' from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency
to incriminate," quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881). A witness
may claim the privilege even if his answer, although insufficient by itself to support a con-
viction, would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
The Hoffinan test has been expanded by the Third Circuit: "It is enough (1) that the
trial court be shown by argument how conceivably a prosecutor, building on the seemingly
harmless answer, might proceed step by step to link the witness with some crime against
the United States, and (2) that this suggested course and scheme of linkage not seem
incredible in the circumstances of the particular case." United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d
438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952). See also Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955).
Because of the extensive criminal liability imposed by the Federal Conspiracy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1952), and the multitude of offenses subject to prosecution under such per-
vasive statutes as the Internal Revenue Code, witnesses will have no difficulty in establishing
the possiblity of self incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d 921 (2d
Cir. 1956), 8 SvYAcusE L. REV. 303 (1957).
For discussion of what constitutes an incriminating answer, see UNIFonm RuLEs oF
EviDENcE rule 24 (1953) (hereinafter cited at UNT-. R EvID.) ; 8 WIGMORE §§2260-61;
Gold, supra note 5; Note, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1454, 1456 (1957).
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A defendant, if he desires, can testify in his own behalf under the federal
enabling statute which removes his common-law disqualification for interest.'"
An unwilling defendant may not be called to the stand, nor may the jury
draw an unfavorable inference from his silence.' 2 If the accused submits to ex-
11. "In the trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses
against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts
of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged
shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall
not create any presumption against him." 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1952). Under the original
federal enabling statute, Act of March 16, 1878, c. 37, 20 STAT. 30, a defendant was
competent at his own request "but not otherwise." Although these words were deleted,
the statute was rewritten "without change of substance." H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong.,
lst Sess. A168 (1947). The evident effect of the statute is to forbid calling of the accused
by the prosecution. 8 WiGmoRE § 2268, at 393; see United States v. Housing Foundation,
Inc., 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949) (defendant may not be called to testify concerning
a codefendant) ; Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1900) (improper
for the government to call a defendant to the stand without a request on his part to
testify) ; cf. People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 664, 245 P.2d 633, 641 (1952) (common-
law incompetency remains unless defendant requests the privilege of testifying under state
enabling statute).
The privilege against self incrimination was fully recognized by 1685. 8 WIGmORE §
2250, at 298, 300. Until that time, a willing defendant could be sworn as a competent
witness; but, reflecting the principle recently established in civil cases, it was then held
that a defendant could not be sworn and had no standing as a witness. This common-law
rule of incompetency rested upon the assumption that self-interest would induce a party
to a civil or criminal proceeding to perjure himself. 2 WIG O E §§ 575, at 684-85, 576.
Nonetheless, the practice of overtly questioning an unsworn defendant at trial did not cease
until the early eighteenth century. 8 WIGMORB § 2250, at 298, 300. Because a defendant
was not allowed counsel in treason cases until 1695, 7 WiLL. 3, c. 3, or in felony cases
until 1836, 6 & 7 WIL. 4, c. 114, he was permitted to plead his case orally and engage in
argument with the court and prosecution. Thus, he was virtually compelled to answer the
case against him, for if the accused failed to make an effective defense, his guilt would be
inferred. WILLIAMs, TiaE PROOF OF GUILT 41 (1955). A defendant in United States courts
was not forced into this dilemma since he has always had the right to employ counsel
-at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 563 (1951), derived from the Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, 1 STAT. 118.
If he could not afford counsel, however, the effect was the same as the English rule.
Originally, in some American state jurisdictions in which the defendant was incompetent,
he was allowed to make unsworn statements. The practice still continues in Georgia, the
only state that has not enacted an enabling statute. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-415, -416 (Supp.
1955).
The constitutional right to refrain from giving self-incriminatory answers includes
defendants since they are now competent to testify, even though at the time of the adoption
of the amendment they were not, and hence their need of the protection could not have
been contemplated. United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 160 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902)
(dictum) ; Corwin, supra note 2, at 12. But see Powell v. United States, 226 F.2d 269, 274
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (court incorrectly states that the privilege as applied to witnesses is
derived from protection designed primarily for the accused).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1952), quoted at note 11 supra. "The purpose of the law was
to make defendants competent witnesses, but at the same time preserve to them the right
to remain silent without prejudice." Wolfson v. United States, supra note 11, at 436.
See also United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Dunmore, Inference
From Clain of Privilege by Accused, 3 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINO. 770 (1913).
In at least one federal case, conviction was reversed because one defendant had been
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amination, however, he will generally be held to have waived his fifth amend-
ment rights in that proceeding.'
3
Although case law is currently in a state of transition,14 the weight of
precedent requires, by analogy to trial procedure, that status also determines
rights before a federal grand jury.' 5 Persons under formal criminal process,
termed de jure defendants, therefore enjoy immunity from interrogation which
must be affirmatively waived.16 Absent notice, understanding and voluntary
called to testify concerning a codefendant. United States v. Housing Foundation, Inc.,
supra note 11, at 666. Granting a defendant the right not to be questioned has been
criticized as an unwarranted extension of the privilege against self incrimination. See
WILLIAms op. cit. supra note 11, at c. 3.
Neither the prosecutor nor the court may comment to the jury on the defendaut's
refusal to take the stand. For collections of cases, see 8 WIOM0RE § 2272; IS U.S.C.A.
at 337 (1951). A different rule has been suggested. "If an accused in a criminal
action does not testify, counsel may comment upon accused's failure to testify, and the
trier of fact may draw all reasonable inferences therefrom." UmIF. R. Evw. 23(4)
and comment. Some states have adopted this practice. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 115 Vt.
94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947) (collecting authorities). See also note 28 infra and accompany-
ing text. The English enabling act forbids comment by the prosecutor but not by
the court. See Queen v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77 (1898). See also Corwin, supra note
2, at 205.
13. Since any relevant fact asserted by a defendant who voluntarily takes the stand
might tend to incriminate him, his offer of testimony upon any fact is a constructive waiver
of fifth amendment protection as to every other relevant fact because of the necessary
connection between them all. 8 WIGMORE § 2276(2) (collecting cases). A more restricted
view found in a few state statutes refuses to extend waiver to criminal acts other than
the one precisely charged. Id. at 448. For the doctrine of waiver as applied to witnesses,
see notes 39-40 intfra.
14. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
924 (1958) (sole test of fifth amendment protection before grand jury is whether testimony
was freely given) ; United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955) (rights of grand jury witnesses are not dependent upon status) ; United States
v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (freedom from compulsion only criterion).
15. See cases cited notes 16-17 infra.
16. Two federal decisions have quashed an indictment on the ground that when inter-
rogated, the grand jury witness was entitled to a trial defendant's right not to be questioned.
See United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (de jure defendant) ;
United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897) (de facto defendant), both discussed
at note 17 infra. Many cases have stated in dicta that a de jure defendant may not be
questioned. See, e.g., Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1935)
(indictment invalid if de jure defendant called before grand jury) ; United States v. Gross-
man, 154 F. Supp. 813, 816-17 (D.N.J. 1957) (de jure defendant cannot be called to
testify) ; United States v. Miller, 80 F. Supp. 979, 981-82 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (de jure de-
fendant may be interrogated only after he is informed of and has waived his right not to be
questioned). Cf. UNIF. R. EviD. 23(1) (accused in a "criminal proceeding" may not be
questioned). The absence of direct holdings is not indicative of the widespread acceptance
of the rule since most prosecutors make it a practice not to call de jure defendants, thereby
obviating court tests. See United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955). But
see United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 162 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902) (status as de lure
defendant only one element in determining if testimony compelled).
For the definition of de jure defendant, see Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1893)
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surrender of the right not to be questioned, if a de jure defendant testifies, a
subsequent indictment may be quashed or his incriminating admissions ex-
cluded at trial.17 In contrast, the grand jury may examine and validly indict
(under indictment, information or complaint); United States v. Kimball, mipra at 162
(arrested and held under any legal process); United States v. Grossman, supra at 816
(same) ; United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1273, No. 14671 (D. Ore. 1871) (no one is
a defendant until some distinct action is brought against him).
17. United States v. Lawn, supra note 16. This is the first federal case since 1897 to
quash an indictment because of a violation of the privilege against self incrimination in the
grand jury room. Relying upon dicta in earlier cases, see note 16 supra, the court found that
Lawn, against whom a criminal information had been filed, was a de jure defendant en-
titled to immunity from questioning. Calling him to the stand without his request to
testify and without informing him of his constitutional rights therefore vitiated the indict-
ment. The court exercised the "inherent power, in its discretion, to dismiss indictments
obtained in violation of the rights of defendants." 115 F. Supp. at 678, citing Mulloney
v. United States, supra note 16; United States v. Miller, ibid; United States v. Kimball,
ibid. In line with prior authority on the status distinction, Lawn nevertheless had scant
precedent for the sanction applied. See 8 WIGmoRE § 2252, at 325-26 n.12. Although the trial
judge's charge to the jury in Mulloney indicated that an indictment based solely upon
the testimony of a de jure defendant could be quashed absent a request to testify, the
appellate court explicitly approved only the portion of the charge directing that as a
matter of law, Mulloney was not a de jure defendant before the grand jury. Mulloney v.
United States, supra note 16, at 579. Neither Kimball nor Miller indicate what effect calling
a de jure defendant to the stand without his request would have. The court in Lawun did
not cite United States v. Edgerton, supra note 16, the only other reported federal case
quashing an indictment obtained in violation of the fifth amendment privilege, perhaps
because Edgerton had not previously been followed. See note 19 infra.
A number of state courts have quashed indictments of de jure defendants called to
testify even though in some cases they had been told of their privilege against self incrimina-
tion. See Culbreath v. State, 22 Ala. App. 143, 113 So. 465 (1927) (witness informed) ;
People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 145 N.E. 207 (1924) (same) ; People v. Singer, 5 N.Y.
Crim. 1 (1886) (same); Commonwealth v. Bane, 39 15a. D. & C. 664 (1940) (same). See
also Boone v. People, 148 Ill. 440, 36 N.E. 99 (1894) (witness not informed) ; Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 51, 118 S.W.2d 140 (1938) (same); State v. Corteau, 198
Minn. 433, 270 N.W. 144 (1936) (same; the grand jury returning no indictment, a prose-
cutor's subsequent information based upon testimony illegally elicited in the grand jury
set aside).
Vindicating constitutional rights by quashing an indictment recognizes that fifth
amendment protection not only operates as an exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, see
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1947), 56 YALE L.J. 1076, but also protects a defendant against conviction by pre-
venting a trial upon the indictment, cf. Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) ; 8 WIGIORE § 2266. Despite the absence of precedent and assuming a violation
of constitutional rights, the sanction applied in Lan seems proper since the motion to
quash was made prior to trial. The grand jury proceeding is designed in part to prevent
unjustified prosecutions, see note 4 supra, and prosecution appears unjustified when indict-,
ment was obtained through violation of constitutional rights.
Once trial has been held, the injury of unwarranted subjection to prosecution has
been inflicted. Given a fair trial in which evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
rights was excluded, the defendant has been accorded adequate fifth amendment protection.
See United States v. Games, 156 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (affirming the conviction
of a witness who had given involuntary statements to the grand jury). "[T]he suppression
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all other witnesses without informing them of their constitutional privilege.18
Distinctions based on status have created an incongruous grand jury witness,
the de facto defendant who, though not formally accused, is marked for prose-
cution. Functionally indistinguishable from a de jure defendant, he enjoys
at the trial of her testimony before the grand jury secured to her the full constitutional
protection to which she was entitled." Id. at 469-70. A fair trial cured whatever defects
were present in the indictment even though it might have been invalidated had the objection
been timely. Id. at 470-71.
In addition to quashing the indictment, the court in Lawn ordered the evidence
produced by the defendants in violation of their fifth amendment privilege suppressed and
returned, thus also applying the rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
discussed note 45 infra. For the subsequent history of this portion of the decision, see
United States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Giglio, 232
F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)
(upholding a subsequent reindictment and conviction upon failure to show that the sup-
pressed testimony had been used in violation of the court order in the initial Lawn decision).
See also N.Y. Times, April 18, 1958, p. 48, col. 1 (indicating that the "tainted"
evidence had been used). For further discussion of Lawn, see notes 29, 31 and 41 infra.
A third basis for quashing an indictment exists. If a statute granting immunity from
prosecution based upon pre-trial testimony applies to the criminal activity under investi-
gation and to the grand jury proceeding in which the witness' testimony was compelled,
prosecution may be barred. See United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424, 432-36 (D. Conn.
1928) (immunity from prosecution under National Prohibition Act as result of testimony
given before grand jury); United States v. Moore, 15 F.2d 593, 594 (D. Ore. 1926)
(same) ; United States v. Pardue, 294 Fed. 543, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1923) (immunity under
Federal Trade Commission Act) ; cf. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) (im-
munity under Sherman Act) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944)
(immunity under Internal Revenue Code). See 8 WIGMoRE § 2282(3); Annot., 38
A.L.R.2d 225, 295-315 (1954), for discussion and collection of cases. Immunity could not
have been claimed in Lawt, for no statute was applicable to the offense charged.
18. The duty of witnesses to appear and testify before a grand jury was recognized
by the Act of Feb. 26, 1853, c. 80, § 3, 10 STAT. 169. This section, together with provision
for compulsory process, is embodied in FED. R. CaIs. P. 17. For application and discussion
of the statute, see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1919).
Apprising a witness of his privilege against self incrimination is not a prerequsite to
a valid indictment. United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955) (de facto defendant before grand jury) ; Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d
944 (6th Cir. 1946) ("mere" witness) ; United States v. Games, supra note 17 (de facto
defendant) ; United States v. Haas, 126 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (same). But see
United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813, 816 (D.N.J. 1957) (indicating that a valid
indictment may not be returned against a de facto defendant unless he was warned) ; United
States v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, 838 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1897) (conviction for perjury before
pension examiner reversed because defendant had been manifestly ignorant of his rights) ;
cf. United States v. Games, supra note 17 (exclusion of involuntary admissions at trial
remedies failure to warn).
A witness was held not entitled to warning in the following cases: Powers v. United
States, 223 U.S. 303, 313 (1912) (preliminary hearing); Wilson v. United States, 162
U.S. 613, 623 (1896) (interrogation by commissioner) ; United States v. Block, 88 F.2d
618, 620 (2d Cir. 1937) (trial). However, FED. R. Cans. P. 5 (b) now requires a warning
in any hearing before a United States commissioner. For a collection of state cases sustain-
ing the indictments of witnesses and de facto defendants who were not advised of their
privilege against self incrimination, see Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 225, 277-82 (1954).
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only the protection of an unimplicated witness and must submit to interroga-
tion without apprisal of the charge pending against him or of his fifth amend-
ment rights.'0 The prosecutor can take advantage of this anomalous treatment
by deferring formal charge, summoning a de facto defendant before the grand
jury and seeking disclosures which ensure indictment and may be used at trial.
°
The anomaly is heightened by the de facto defendant's relative lack of protection,
since formal charge makes the de jure accused aware of the danger of self incrimi-
nation and the need for counsel.2 1 On the other hand, by refusing de facto de-
19. In each of the following cases, although the defendant when called before the
grand jury had not been formally charged, the prosecutor intended to proceed against him
at trial. Despite the already intended prosecution, grand jury interrogation was approved
without defendant's having requested it since no charge had been preferred. United States
v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958) (prosecutor had
information implicating defendants) ; United States v. Scully, supra note 18, at 115 (same);
Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 579-80 (1st Cir. 1935) (witness previously
indicted but indictment lapsed) ; United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d 215, 217, 219 (2d Cir.
1934) (Post Office Department had issued fraud order naming defendants); O'Connell
v. United States, 40 F.2d 201, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1930) (defendant's activities had been
subject of grand jury investigation) ; United States v. Price, 163 Fed. 904 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1908) (U.S. Attorney General had requested indictment of defendants) ; cf. United States
v. Wetmore, 218 Fed. 227, 233 (W.D. Pa. 1914). The only reported federal case
quashing an indictment of a de facto defendant is United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374
.(D. Mont. 1897). The case has since either been distinguished on its facts, see United
States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 167 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902), or completely disregarded,
perhaps as an unwarranted extension of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
See United States v. Mangiaracina, 92 F. Supp. 96, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1950) ("the case ...
has never been followed"); United States v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547, 550-51 (W.D. Ky.
1943) (same). But see Powell v. United States, 226 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
("serious constitutional question" whether a de facto defendant is subject to grand jury
subpoena); cf. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1956) (concurring
opinion) (subpoena power of immigration officers should exclude potential defendants
prior to deportation proceedings).
Most states allow de facto defendants to be questioned as ordinary witnesses. Annot.,
38 A.L.R.2d 225, 277-82 (1954). In the following cases, however, state courts have quashed
the indictments of de facto defendants called to testify before the grand jury. Culbreath v.
State, 22 Ala. App. 143, 113 So. 465 (1927) ; People v. Schneider, 133 Colo. App. 173,
292 P.2d 982 (1956) (de facto defendant must be warned of rights) ; State v. Allison,
116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944) (same; coroner's jury). See also Jenkins v. State,
65 Ga. App. 16, 14 S.E.2d 594 (1941); State v. Rixon, 180 Minn. 573, 231 N.W. 217
(1930); State v. Caperton, 276 Mo. 314, 207 S.W. 795 (1918); People v. Seman, 174
Misc. 792, 21 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S.D. 162, 257
N.W. 113 (1934).
20. See Powell v. United States, supra note 19, at 274 (criticizing such procedure).
But see Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 228-29 (1st Cir. 1954) (de facto defendant
not guilty of contempt in refusing to return to the grand jury for further interrogation
after he had indicated by invoking the fifth amendment that he would not answer any
questions).
21. If the de jure defendant has been arrested upon a complaint, he will have been
taken before a commissioner, informed of his privilege against self incrimination and given
a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel. FED P. CPan. P. 17. Similarly, if an informa-
tion has been filed, the accused will have been informed of the alleged offense with sufficient
particularity to apprise him of the need for counsel. FED. R. Caim. P. 7.
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fendants immunity from questioning, courts have enhanced criminal investiga-
tion. If grand juries could not examine implicated parties, valuable sources of in-
formation would be foreclosed ;22 furthermore, quashing an indictment on the
ground that a witness was a potential defendant would often be an illusory safe-
guard since reindictment could be readily obtained.23 Pre-trial interrogation
is not uninhibited, however, for the fifth amendment prohibits compelling a
person to be a witness against himself.24 Implementing this restriction, recent
22. "[A]ny other ruling would create grave problems in the administration of Grand
Jury proceedings. Whenever a witness before the Grand Jury is subsequently indicted,
it would be necessary to fathom the minds and the hearts of both the Grand Jurors and the
United States Attorney, in order to determine whether at the time they were called the
defendants were targets of the investigation and were marked for prosecution. Such is
the rationale of the general Federal rule." United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813,
817 (D.N.J. 1957) (refusing to extend the right not to be questioned to de facto defendants
who had been apprised of their constitutional protection). See also United States v.
Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 168 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902):
"The theory of limiting grand juries to questioning persons disconnected with
a ruined bank as to the cause thereof, in timorous expectation that a less remote
search might chance to bring the persons guiltily concerned into the presence and
under the examination of the jury, is not consonant with that vigor of inquiry that
such exigencies demand. The persons whose duties converged at such bank would
be those who should know, and it is of these persons that an investigating grand
jury should inquire, not of those who, isolated from its affairs, would be presumed
to have no knowledge. While much is due to the conservation of personal rights,
the administration of justice should not be fettered by a sentimentality that
would paralyze efficient action."
Because the grand jury can inquire into any area of supposed criminal activity, it
may question a de facto defendant concerning activity which is not related to the crime
for which he is marked for prosecution. Thus, the interrogation may involve matters to
which the fifth amendment privilege could not be claimed because, for example, the statute
of limitations has run, double jeopardy doctrine prevents a subsequent indictment, statu-
tory immunity has been granted, see 8 WIGM00RE §§ 2279-83, or because the questioning
calls for nonincriminatory replies, see it re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931) ; United
States v. Kimball, supra at 168.
23. An indictment will not be quashed because based upon insufficient or incompetent
evidence. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), discussed note 31 infra. More-
over, Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), indicates that a reindictment is valid
even if based upon evidence that was obtained through violation of fifth amendment rights
during a prior grand jury hearing and would be inadmissable at trial. Thus, quashing an
indictment of a de facto defendant would only delay but not prevent an ultimate trial on
the merits.
24. In dealing with pre-arraignment interrogation of suspected offenders, the Supreme
Court has either required that testimony be voluntary, see Wilson v. United States, 162
U.S. 613 (1896), or demanded strict compliance with the provision of FED. R. CRI . P. 5(a)
forbidding "unnecessary" delay in bringing an arrested person before the nearest available
commissioner, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). There is no prohibition
against orderly examination as such, and policemen enjoy a limited area of tolerance
within which they may effectively operate. "Circumstances may justify a brief delay
between arrest and arraignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused
is susceptible of quick verification through third parties." Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957). The delay in Mallory amounted to compulsion, and the con-
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cases no longer equate a de facto defendant with a witness at trial and simply
require that his, or any witness', testimony be voluntary. 25
Courts could extend the test of volition to embrace all grand jury witnesses
by abolishing the de jure defendant's immunity from interrogation. By its terms,
the statute conferring the right to refrain from testifying applies only to a
defendant at trial.28 Because, prior to the statute, defendants were not com-
petent to take the stand, courts have never been required to decide whether
freedom from questioning is part of the fifth amendment.2 7 The amendment
might afford the same protection as the statute since mere resort to the
privilege not to incriminate oneself could constitute evidence of guilt in the
eyes of a trier of fact.28 When, however, not the imposition of criminal sanc-
fession obtained was a violation of the defendant's rights. His statements were not to be
excluded, however, merely because obtained between arrest and arraignment. Thus, prior
to trial, the privilege against self incrimination "is merely an option of refusal, not a
prohibition of inquiry." 8 WrGmORE § 2268, at 388. See also United States v. Mitchell,
322 U.S. 65 (1944) (confession legally obtained is not rendered inadmissable by a sub-
sequent illegal detention). For general discussion, see Maguire, "Involuntary" Confes-
sions, 31 TuL. L. REv. 125 (1956).
25. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
924 (1958); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955); United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v.
Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1952), quoted at note 11 supra. The statutory phrase, "courts of
inquiry in any State," refers not to grand juries but to military proceedings prior to courts
martial. See United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 742 (S.D. Cal. 1953). Nevertheless,
courts have at times implied that the statute is applicable to the grand jury. United States v.
Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 161 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902) ; United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674,
677 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); cf. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313 (1912) (statute
applicable to preliminary hearing; now governed by FED. R. ClUm. P. 5).
27. Two cases deny that the Constitution affords a right not to be questioned. United
States v. Kimball, supra note 26, at 160-61 (rights under the enabling statutes are not em-
bodied in the Constitution; summoning a defendant before the jury and asking him to
answer is not a per se violation of the Constitution, but at most of the law of the state) ;
United States v. Price, 163 Fed. 904, 906-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (immunity from questioning
quite different from the rule regarding self incrimination; it is a statutory, not a constitu-
tional privilege). See Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused T& Testify, '31 MicHa.
L. REv. 40, 41 (1932) ; note 28 infra.
The only case purporting to hold that compelling a defendant at trial to take the stand
and testify violates a constitutionally protected right is United States v. Housing Founda-
tion, Inc., 176 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1949). But because the defendant was made to testify
over his objection, this case is unclear on whether the mere summoning of a defendant to
the stand would be a violation of the fifth amendment. See also Powell v. United States,
226 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("[I]t would seem to be clear that a prosecutor
could not even call to the stand in a criminal trial the person being tried") (dictum).
28. Calling an unwilling defendant to the stand at trial could only emphasize his
refusal to reply, thus suggesting an inference of guilt which the jury could not be effectively
prevented from drawing. Giving a defendant an option of admitting an incriminating
fact or keeping silent and letting the same fact be inferred would accord him less fifth
amendment protection at trial than a complete proscription of questioning. See 8 WIGMORE
§§ 2268, 2272-73. See also United States v. Hamilton, 97 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.W. Va.
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tions but the preliminary investigation of crime is undertaken, the existence of
constitutional immunity from interrogation is doubtful.2 9 That the fifth amend-
ment does not guarantee an unqualified right to remain silent without prejudice
1951) : "I am compelled to conclude that, because of the Court's omission in not rebuking
government counsel for his remarks concerning [the defendant's] ... failure to testify, and
the Court's further omission of any instruction to the jury to disregard the statements,
[the defendant] ... was deprived of [his fifth amendment] ... privilege. As a result, he did
not receive the fair and impartial trial which is guaranteed to every defendant." Thus, im-
munity from interrogation at trial is not based upon opposition to compulsory disclosure,
for the option of refusal would be sufficient, but upon a desire to exclude the prejudicial
effect of a claim of privilege. That the fifth amendment actually grants immunity is
unclear, however. The Supreme Court has twice held that a state statute or constitutional
provision permitting both comment upon and inference from the defendant's failure to
take the stand does not violate due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
The Court in Tzeining "assumed only for the purpose of discussion that what was done in
the case at bar was an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination. [It did]
... not intend, however, to lend any countenance to the truth of that assumption.... The
authorities upon the question are in conflict." Id. at 114. But see the dissenting opinion
of Justice Iarlan. Ibid. A prominent commentator has said that fifth amendment immunity
for defendants at trial is an open question. Corwin, supra note 2, at 201, 205.
In Adainson, the majority opinion assumed without deciding that permitting comment
in a federal court on defendant's silence would violate the fifth amendment. 332 U.S. at 50.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, agreed that as part of the immunity granted, com-
ment on the failure of the accused to take the stand is forbidden in federal prosecution. Id
at 61. It is not clear, however, whether he was speaking of constitutional or statutory
immunity. Justice Black, in dissent, interpreted the majority opinion as implying that the
constitutional privilege did not, of itself, bar comment at a federal trial upon the defendant's
failure to testify. Id. at 69.
See also Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N.Y. 456, 468, 119 N.E. 102, 106 (1918) (New York
constitutional provision protecting against self incrimination does not grant immunity from
examination). The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws would permit both inference from and comment on defendant's
silence. MODEL CODE OF EvID NcE rule 201(3) (1942) ; UNiF. R. Evm. 23(4). But see
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957) (allowing petit jury to consider claim
of privilege made before the grand jury has "grave" constitutional overtones); Helton
v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341, 342 (5th Cir. 1955) (violation of "spirit, if not the
letter" of fifth amendment to admit testimony that defendant was given opportunity prior
to trial to explain presence of marijuana and failed to do so) ; Note, 40 MINN. L. REv.
598 (1956).
When enabling statutes were first passed, one commentator believed them to be un-
constitutional as effectively violating the privilege against self incrimination because the
jury could not be prevented from drawing an inference of guilt from the defendant's
failure to exercise his right to testify. See Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the
Acctsed To Testify, 14 Am. L. REv. 753, 762-63 (1880). For discussion and collection of
cases determining the constitutionality of statutes authorizing comment on failure to testify,
see Note, 57 YALE L.J. 145 (1947). See also 8 WIGORE §§ 2272-73; Rattner, Consequences
of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-lncrimination, 24 U. CmI. L. Rnv. 472 (1957).
29. See United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955) (policy underlying pro-
hibition of inference from claim of privilege at trial has no application to inquisitorial
proceedings of grand jury). See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956),
discussed note 31 infra (grand jury may indict on merest scintilla of evidence) ; United States
v. Games, 156 F. Supp. 467,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (grand jury not governed by application of
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is demonstrated by the inferences which juries in civil cases may draw from a
claim of the privilege.2 0
same rules that operate at trial; to provide otherwise would transform the grand jury's in-
vestigation into a full preliminary trial to which defendants are not entitled) ; Note, 65
YALE L.J. 390 (1956) ; cf. State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 72-74, 9 A.2d 63, 69-70 (1939)
(defendant's contention that he was prejudiced before the grand jury by his claim of
privilege rejected).
Currently, if a defendant does not take the stand at trial, the fact that he failed to
testify at a preliminary or other prior examination is not admissable. 8 WIGasORE §
2272a, at 418; cf. Helton v. United States, supra note 28. If, however, the defendant elects
to take the stand, the prosecutor may attempt to introduce a prior claim of the privilege
in order to impeach. Such evidence is admissible to discredit a defendant's veracity only
if a prior claim is inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Grunewald v. United States,
supra note 28, at 418 (possible impermissible impact upon the jury would outweigh the
probative value of the claim in discrediting defendant's testimony). The only cases subse-
quent to Grunewald deciding the same question have held evidence of a prior claim of
privilege inadmissible. United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 691 (2d Cir. 1957)
(witness' refusal to answer grand jury questions not sufficiently inconsistent with trial
testimony to merit admission) ; Travis v. United States, 247 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir.
1957) (questioning character witness as to defendant's claim of privilege during con-
gressional hearing of insignificant probative value).
The decision in United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), see note
17 supra, quashing an indictment of a de jure defendant who had been called to testify,
was implicitly based upon a desire to prevent a grand jury inference of guilt from invo-
cation of the privilege. Under Lam, a de jure defendant would apparently be able to
ignore a grand jury subpoena or, if he did appear, would have to be informed of and
exercise his right not to be questioned outside the presence of the grand jury. But nothing
precludes the prosecutor from bringing to the grand jury's attention the fact that a witness
has refused to testify or that he is already under legal process, thereby circumventing
Lawn.
30. United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275
U.S. 13, 52-53 (1927) (jury allowed to consider failure of defendant to testify in action
to cancel lease on grounds of fraud and corruption). See Rattner, supra note 28, at 476
& n.16.
A private employer may fire his employees for invoking the fifth amendment. United
Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (employer
may discharge employees for refusal to testify before congressional committee); see
Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 941 (1953). See Finkelhor & Stockdale, The Professor and the Fifth Amnendment,
16 U. PIrr. L. REv. 344 (1955) ; Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political Blacklisting" in the
Entertainment Industry, 29 So. CALin. L. REv. 263 (1956) ; Comment, Loyalty and Private
Employment: The Right of Employers To Discharge Suspected Subversives, 62 YALE L.J.
954 (1953). It is not clear, however, whether a governmental employer may constitution-
ally consider invocation of the privilege in discharging an employee. See Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REv. 83,
120 (1956) (violation of due process for the New York City Board of Education to discharge
a college professor, pursuant to a New York state law, for invoking the fifth amendment
before a Senate Committee without holding a hearing as to his fitness to remain on the
faculty; the Court did not indicate whether a dismissal based solely upon invocation of the
fifth amendment after a full hearing would be unconstitutional). Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (a state may not dismiss teachers for mere membership in an
organization listed by the Attorney General as subversive); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (affirming dismissal
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Grand jury inference of probable guilt based in part on a claim of fifth
amendment protection is a logical exercise of the investigative function. A
grand jury is not bound by rules of evidence and may base an indictment upon
rationally persuasive testimony that would be insufficient or incompetent at
trial.38 Invocation of the privilege, though compatible with innocence, has
sufficient probative value to merit consideration in determining whether an
accused should stand trial.32 Extrinsic implicating evidence coupled with the
of a federal employee although at her hearing the employee could not cross-examine
adverse witnesses) ; Rattner, supra note 28, at 511.
31. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). If indictments were open to
challenge on the ground of incompetent or inadequate evidence, a "preliminary trial" to
determine the sufficiency and admissibility of evidence would be necessary. "An indict-
ment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information
drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge
on the merits." Id. at 363. Costello had been indicted solely on the presentation of hearsay
evidence, but the rationale of the majority opinion, and the concurring opinion of Justice
Burton which would restrict the decision, id. at 364, indicate that the holding may be
extended to situations in which the grand jury considers other forms of inadequate or
incompetent evidence. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (indictment may
be valid even though based on evidence previously suppressed by court order). See also
Notes, 65 YALE L.J. 390 (1956), 62 HARv. L. REv. 111 (1948).
32. The principal argument against drawing an inference of guilt from invocation of
the fifth amendment is that witnesses may find it desirable to invoke the privilege for
reasons independent of their guilt or innocence. GaIswoLD, THE Firn AMENDMENT
TODAY 8-27, 56-68 (1955). But this argument is not without qualification. "It may well
be, as has been said by high authority, that the Fifth Amendment protects against prosecution
for crime, but it cannot protect against the obvious inference which would be taken by any
thinking person. I would like to suggest again that in many circumstances that inference
is not wholly warranted. A person who thinks a little further about the matter may
find .that there are many factors in some of these situations which must be taken into
account before he reaches any conclusion about the inference he should take." Id. at 57.
(Emphasis added.) See also Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 39 MARQ. L. REv.
191, 201 (1956) : "I do not by any means take the position that a claim of privilege
under the Fifth Amendment is an absolutely colorless act simply to be disregarded and
nothing could happen when a person claims the privilege."
However, in HooK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FittrH AMENDMENT (1957), the author
takes issues with the general thesis of Griswold's book. He states that a natural or reason-
able inference in law is guided not by pure logic or abstract mathematical possibilities
but by reliable generalizations concerning human behavior, psychology and customs. Even
though the inference of guilt from the invocation of the privilege may be erroneous, it is
legitimate, for to deny the inference is more often a mistake than to affirm it. Id. at 33-39.
Because of the lesser requirement of certainty in the grand jury proceeding, see notes 29, 31
s.rpra, inference from the claim can be justified though it might not be at trial, see note
28 supra.
Justice Reed, writing for the majority in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 56
(1947), thought it natural that the prosecution should bring out the strength of the
evidence by commenting upon the defendant's failure to explain or deny. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, pointed out that sensible and just-minded men in important affairs
of life deem it significant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and
responsible evidence against him which is within his power to contradict. Id. at 60.
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suspect's refusal to explain can produce a reasonable doubt of innocence.33 An
indictment based solely upon claim of the privilege, however, should be quashed
as failing to establish probable cause.
3 4
Thus, all persons summoned before a grand jury could be required to take
the stand-and the anomalous distinction beween de facto and de jure defend-
ants eliminated-provided constitutional freedom from compulsion was pre-
served. Currently, grand jury witnesses face secret examination without benefit
of counsel or judicial supervision. 35 To prevent the prosecutor from inducing
a witness into unwitting relinquishment of his right not to reply, three minimal
safeguards are needed.36 The prosecutor or foreman should inform each
See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1908); State v. Grebe, 17 Kan.
458 (1877) ; Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N.Y. 456, 468, 119 N.E. 102,106 (1918) ; WILLIATIS
op. cit. supra note 11, at 56-61; Rattner, supra note 28, at 473; Reeder, supra note 27,
at 46.
In Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956), discussed note 30 supra,
the Court condemned the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of the fifth
amendment privilege. However, the deprivation of due process of law found in Slochdwer
lay in the failure to grant a hearing to determine the defendant's fitness to hold a teaching
position. Seemingly, no constitutional right would be violated if invocation were deemed
sufficient to call for such an inquiry, which in effect, is the proper significance of invocation
of the privilege before the grand jury.
33. The inference of guilt does not arise from the invocation of the privilege alone
but from the exercise of the right to remain silent in the face of unrefuted, incriminating
evidence. See 8 WIGmORE §§ 2273(4)-2276(a), at 433-44; Rattner, supra note 28, at
474, 477.
34. Requiring that the prosecutor offer some extrinsic evidence of guilt would inhibit
persecution of totally unimplicated parties and encourage independent search for evidence.
The requirement could be enforced by quashing indictments resting on a witness' claim of
constitutional protection and not supported by other evidence connecting accused with the
alleged crime.
35. Sixth amendment right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions" does not include
the grand jury. Gilmore v. United States, 129 F2d 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 631 (1942). Nor are witnesses allowed to bring counsel with them into the grand
jury. In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931) (drawing analogy to the rights of
witnesses at trial); United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812, 816 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
No judge is present in the grand jury. Powell v. United States, 226 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), though a judge charges the grand jurors when they are summoned and sworn,
see Yankwich, Charge to Federal Grand Jury, in 19 F.R.D. 117 (1956). For a list of the
persons who may be present before a grand jury, see FFD. R. CRim. P. 6(d).
A grand jury need not state in a subpoena to a witness either the subject matter of the
investigation or the person against whom the inquiry is directed. Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1905). The grand jury's range of inquiry is not limited by any predictable
results of the investigation. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) ; Howard v.
United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1950). The grand jury may pursue all ramifications
of a particular inquiry. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943). "Broadly
speaking, there are no restrictions to the investigating power of the grand jury in criminal
matters provided it confines its activities to the purposes which led the court to call it into
existence." Gold, supra note 5, at 395.
36. For discussion of prosecutor tactics attempting to elicit incriminatory replies, see
United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1955) (concurring opinion) ; Hooley
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witness of his constitutional protection and of the fact that testimony may sub-
sequently be introduced at trial.3 7 In addition, courts should maintain their
present strictures forbidding intimidation of grand jury witnesses.38 Finally,
the doctrine of waiver-requiring a full explanation of an incriminating ad-
mission-should not be employed in grand jury proceedings.3 9 Applicable at
trial to prevent concealment on cross-examination, 40 the doctrine may entrap
v. United States, 209 F.2d 234, 235 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d
944, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, 839-41 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.
1897) ; People v. Luckman, 164 Misc. 230, 297 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
37. On the desirability of warning, see United States v. Scully, supra note 36, at 116
(arguing that de facto defendant should be able to quash his indictment if not informed of
his privilege) (concurring opinion); Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 277 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) ; United States v. Bell, supra note 36, at 838-39; see also United States v. Gross-
man, 154 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D.N.J. 1957) (de facto defendant may be interrogated
"providing he is warned") ; Note, 34 TEXAS L. Rav. 641 (1956); Comment, 1956 WASH.
U.L.Q. 373, 376; cf. United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(warning gave de facto defendant full protection under the circumstances).
For the desirability of giving grand jury witnesses a full understanding that testimony
can be used at trial, see United States v. Garnes, 156 F. Supp. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
see also United States v. Bell, supra note 36, at 838-39.
38. No fraud, deception or duress may be imposed upon a grand jury witness.
See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Kimball, 117
Fed. 156, 163 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902); United States v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, 838-39 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1897).
In United States v. Games, supra note 37, an "ignorant" woman was told that if she
did not testify, "a U.S. Marshal would be sent to get her." Although a motion to quash
the indictment was denied because untimely, the defendant's testimony was excluded at
trial because involuntary.
39. The doctrine of waiver, at first generally confined to adversary proceedings, see
8 WmiGoRE § 2276, at 438-39 n.1, has been held applicable to the grand jury, United States v.
St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942). Under the doctrine, once an incriminating
fact has been revealed, the witness "cannot invoke the privilege where response to the
specific question... would not further incriminate her." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367, 373 (1951). Commentators have suggested two possible interpretations of Rogers.
Either the privilege is waived whenever any fact has been admitted which a witness
would have been privileged to conceal, or there is no waiver until the witness has admitted
every material element of a crime. Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrinzination in the
Federal Courts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1454, 1459 (1957) ; Comment, Waiver of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 542, 544-45 (1957). In United States v.
Courtney, 236 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1956), the court adopted the broad interpretation of
Rogers in refusing to find that a grand jury witness had waived the privilege when only
one element of a crime had been admitted. For a general discussion of waiver, see 8
WiGmoRa §§ 2275-78; Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Doctrine of
Waiver, 61 YALE L.J. 105, 108-09 (1952).
40. "[T]he usual justification of the doctrine [at trial] is that in its absence a witness
for one side would be able, under questioning of friendly counsel, to present a distorted
picture of the facts, while escaping the corrective of a vigorous cross-examination. Instead
of ruling out such one-sided testimony altogether, courts preferred to use waiver to protect
the rights of parties. They required disclosure of 'details' to place the testimony in a balanced
perspective, and to ensure a fair trial." Note, 61 YAIE L.J. 105, 108 (1952).
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even the well-informed witness and is inappropriate in an ex parte proceeding
from which counsel are barred.
41
Requiring that every grand jury witness undergo questioning with full com-
prehension of his rights and a fair opportunity to exercise them would sub-
stitute a uniform test of volition for superficial considerations of status.
42
41. The rationale underlying the doctrine has no application to an ex parte pro-
ceeding. The balance of interest is not between the rights of an adverse party and those
of a witness, but between the state's rights to information and the witness' right not to
incriminate himself. See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 105, 109 (1952). Furthermore, witnesses
are not allowed to bring counsel whose advice could prevent an inadvertent waiver of
the privilege. See note 35 supra. To sacrifice the witness' rights in an ex parte proceeding
attacks the underlying purpose of the privilege-to prevent the state from forcing in-
crimination by abuse of the inquisitorial method. 8 WIGMORE § 2251. Justice Black,
dissenting in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951), discussed note 39 supra,
stated that the witness before a grand jury had no intention of relinquishing her privilege
against self incrimination by answering preliminary questions. Criticizing the majority
opinion, he stated: "[T]oday's holding creates this dilemma for witnesses: On the one
hand, they risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the privilege prematurely; on
the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer a single question. The Court's
view makes the protection depend on timing so refined that lawyers, let alone laymen,
will have difficulty in knowing when to claim it." Id. at 378. Compare United States v.
St. Pierre, 128 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1942), with United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837
(2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); cf. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303,
314-16 (1912) (waiver at preliminary hearing).
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), according a de jure de-
fendant before the grand jury the rights of a defendant at trial, may not afford as great a
protection as would at first appear. If a de jure defendant elects to testify in the grand
jury, he may be held to have waived his privilege against self incrimination if trial rules
are applicable. See note 13 supra. The question has not been decided.
English law does not recognize the doctrine of waiver and the witness may halt in
his testimony and invoke the privilege at any point. Regina v. Garbett, 2 Car. & K. 474,
495, 175 Eng. Rep. 196, 205 (N.P. 1847). For modern cases on the English rule, see 13
HALsBUR, LAws OF ENGLAND 730-33 (2d ed. 1934). Application of the English rule
to the grand jury would prevent the inadvertent loss of a constitutional privilege, would
not impair the function of the grand jury in determining probable cause, and would not
be inimical to the policy underlying the doctrine of waiver.
42. A volition test was first developed with respect to a grand jury proceeding in
United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 163, 165 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902): "Compulsion
is the antithesis of willingness. . . . Any unlawful action by the district attorney, or
by the jury, or other official, that should appear to have impaired the exercise of the
free will of the witness in choosing whether he would testify, should be regarded as
compulsion." For other definitions of volition, see United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908
(2d Cir. 1957) (testimony freely given, all things considered) ; Mulloney v. United States,
79 F.2d 566, 576 (1st Cir. 1935) (free opportunity to exercise rights) ; United States v.
Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D.N.J. 1957) (as long as witness is warned, irrelevant
that he was marked for prosecution) ; see also United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir. 1955) (whether witness was aware of his rights and if informed, would have testified
differently). But see concurring opinion of Judge Frank, id. at 117 (warning always
necessary to insure voluntary testimony because improper to speculate if witness was
aware of his rights or if he would have testified differently had he known them).
Two early cases developed a "voluntary test" for the admissibility of pre-trial state-
ments. See Powers v. United States, supra note 41, at 314 (statement at pre-
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Applying the test, courts would quash an indictment of any grand jury witness
who did not voluntarily waive his constitutional privilege.43 This procedure
would avert the danger of self incrimination by a person who was likely to
forfeit his rights because he was unaware of them. 44 Furthermore, admissions
obtained from the uninformed or intimidated witness should be excluded at
trial and in subsequent grand jury proceedings to preclude facile reindictment .1
These safeguards-together with a requirement that indictments rest at least
in part on incriminating evidence other than a refusal to reply 46 -would assure
liminary hearing) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1S96) (confession before
commissioner). See also United States v. Block, 88 F2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1937) (ad-
mitting at trial confession made in previous trial because the admission was "freely given,
all things considered"). Courts have considered a variety of factors in determining
whether statements made by a defendant were voluntary. See United States v. Klein,
supra at 920-21 (witness was warned) ; Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d 944, 948 (6th
Cir. 1946) (education) ; United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(witness had received advice of counsel before and during grand jury proceeding). For
discussion of circumstances precluding a finding of voluntary waiver of right to counsel,
see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
In United States v. Hoffa, supra, the defendant, who had been warned of his privilege,
attempted to have his indictment quashed on the ground that his testimony had been
compelled. Refusing to extend the rule of United States v. Lawn, supra note 41, the
court found that, "Hoffa clearly was not "de factd an accused' when called before the
Grand Jury," 156 F. Supp. at 514, and had waived his privilege by failing to invoke it after
being warned, id. at 510. From the circumstances of the case, however, it would seem that
Hoffa was implicated in the criminal activity under investigation and that this fact was
known to the prosecutor. The court distinguished Lawn as applicable only to de jure de-
fendants, id. at 514 n.4, and noted that Judge Frank's rule, in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Scully, supra, had not been violated even if it were the law, since Hoffa had
been warned. "Gauged by exacting and sensitive constitutional standards, the conduct
of the United States Attorney and the Grand Jury recognized and respected the defendant's
rights completely. The record shows clearly that he was not tricked nor imposed upon
nor misled." Id. at 514. In light of all the circumstances, there could have been no com-
pulsion. Id. at 515.
43. See United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). This should
only be applied if a motion to quash is made prior to trial. If there has been conviction,
the issue on appeal should be whether or not compelled evidence had been admitted at
trial. See note 17 supra.
44. See note 37 supra; cf. United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1955)
(concurring opinion).
45. The rule excluding coerced confessions and leads obtained therefrom at trial is
established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 344-46 (1943). For application to evidence given before the grand jury, see
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 678 .(S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; see also In re Fried, 161
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947) (suppressing involuntary testimony in advance of trial).
If testimony is compelled in one grand jury investigation, it should not be introduced
in a subsequent hearing to obtain an indictment. See United States v. Giglio, 232 F.2d
589, 595 (2d Cir. 1956) (implying that "tainted" evidence would be grounds for dismissal
of an indictment). But see Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (implying that
reindictment valid even when based on "tainted" evidence).
46. See notes 33-34 mpra.
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meaningful fifth amendment protection.47 Yet, within this framework, effective
grand jury examination of all summoned parties could be achieved.
47. An even greater though more radical protection for a witness would permit
counsel to accompany him into the grand jury room, to sit by him as at a congressional
hearing and to advise him on the exercise of the privilege against self incrimination.
For general discussion, see BEANEY, RIGHT TO CouNsEL Ix AMERICAN COURTS (1955) ;
Becker & Heidelbaugh, Right to Counsel in Crininal Cases, 23 NoTRE DAME LAW. 351
(1953) ; Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in. Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV.
559, 587-89 (1951) ; Fellman, Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 281,
292.
For the view that the presence of counsel would violate the secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings, see Gold, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 395, 405 (1951). A lawyer trained in investigation and trial work
might also be able to discover the prosecutor's case against his client from the nature of the
interrogation. Excluding counsel for this reason, however, is inconsistent with the pre-
trial discovery provisions of FED. R. CRrm. P. 7(f), 16, and the right to employ counsel
at arraignment, id. 5(e). If the lawyer's role before the grand jury could be restricted to
advising the witness as to his privilege against self incrimination, thus avoiding delay
and impairment of grand jury proceedings resulting from objections on the basis of
relevancy, jurisdiction, form of questions and the like, the position of prosecutor and
witness would be equalized both before as well as after indictment. See Orfield, Discovery
and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 221 (1957). Because
of the freewheeling nature of the grand jury, however, counsel doubtless will continue to
be excluded in the future.
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